The linguistic categories apparent in people's everyday language use provide us with interesting insights into the working of the mind. In this article we study the way in which Dutch speakers categorize causally related events by expressing them with the connectives dus`so' or daarom`that's why'. These two connectives both express volitional and epistemic causal coherence relations. Their overlapping contexts of use raise the question of why two separate, highly grammaticalized linguistic items exist to express similar relationships. We propose an analysis of these connectives, clarifying their similarities and dierences, in terms of subjectivity: the amount of speaker involvement. Empirical support for this analysis is presented from corpus studies and experiments in which language users were asked to state their preference for one of the connectives in contexts displaying dierent degrees of subjectivity.
Human beings categorize the world around them, and usually they do so unconsciously. The linguistic categories apparent in people's everyday language use provide us with many interesting insights into the working of the mind (see, for instance, Lako 1987, Lako and Johnson 1999) . In this article we study one speci®c type of linguistic categorization: the way in which Dutch speakers categorize causally related events by expressing them with the connectives dus or daarom. These two Dutch causal connectives at ®rst sight show much overlap in meaning and use, which raises the question why two separate, highly grammaticalized linguistic items exist to express similar causal relationships. We propose an analysis of these connectives, clarifying their similarities and dierences. Since we feel that theoretical ideas on language in use should ideally be tested empirically, we present support for our proposal from corpus studies and experiments.
Our particular interest in studying connectives springs from the view that the grounding of language in discourse is central to any functional account of language (Langacker 2001) . After all, language users communicate through discourse. A crucial characteristic of discourse is that it shows coherence. One fundamental type of coherence is that of causality: people can connect discourse segments by a causal relationship of some kind, as in (1a). Although coherence is generally considered a cognitive phenomenon, relatively independent of the exact linguistic realization in the discourse itself, both linguists and psycholinguists assume that connectives have the function of signaling relationships between discourse segments, thereby``instructing'' interlocutors to construct a coherence relation between two clauses (see, among others, Gernsbacher and GivoÂ n 1995; Noordman and Vonk 1997; Sanders and Spooren 2001) , as in (1b).
(1) a. The neighbors suddenly left for Paris last Friday. They are not at home. b. The neighbors suddenly left for Paris last Friday. So they are not at home.
Here, the connective so signals that the situation reported in the second segment (S2) is the result of the situation reported in the ®rst segment (S1). When language users want to relate two discourse segments in a causal way, they can use causal connectives like English because, so, and since, or lexical cue phrases like English as a result, that's why, and on the grounds that. Although all these linguistic means may express causality in one way or another, it is clear that they cannot be used interchangeably. In English, it is perfectly ®ne to use As a result / That's why / So to connect the segments of (1), see (1c), but it is impossible to use As a result to connect the segments of (2). (This impossibility is expressed by the symbol #, which signals an uninterpretable sequence; this symbol should not be confused with *, which signals an ungrammatical sequence.) Also, it is at least doubtful whether That's why could be used in (2), as indicated by the ?, whereas So would ®t neatly.
(1) c. The neighbors suddenly left for Paris last Friday. As a result / That's why / So they are not at home.
The lights in the neighbors' living room are out. #As a result / ?That's why / So they are not at home.
Hence, there are restrictions on the use of a cue phrase and connectives.
Since Halliday and Hasan (1976) , it has repeatedly been argued that the lexicon of connectives and cue phrases is ordered according to the type of relation they can express (e.g., Knott and Dale 1994; Knott 2001; Knott and Sanders 1998; Pander Maat 1998 , 1999 . For instance, temporal connectives can be distinguished from causal connectives. Yet, as the examples (1) and (2) show, the restrictions on the use of connectives and cue phrases also hold within the class of causal relations as suchÐnot all causal markers express the same type of causal relation. How then, can these restrictions be described?
Three Dutch causal connectives
In earlier work (Pander Maat and Sanders 1995 , 1996 we have focused on the meaning and use of three Dutch causal connectives: daardoor, daarom, and dus. All three connectives express causality in a``forward'' direction, that is, cause precedes consequence. These connectives are the most frequently used ones of that type (Uit Den Bogaart 1975) . They can best be translated in English by means of the phrases we used in examples (1) and (2): daardoor is similar to as a result / as a consequence, daarom can best be translated as that's why, and dus is quite similar to so. In (3) and (4) All three connectives ®t in (3), although they do express dierent relations.
Daardoor expresses a simple cause±consequence relation in which the second segment (S2) might even be an unforeseen outcome of the ®rst segment (S1) (``They had to go to Paris''); with daarom the sequence can be interpreted as a so-called volitional relation in which the ®rst segment contains the reason for an intentional action in the second segment (``Going to Paris is their reason for leaving home''); and with dus, the second segment is a conclusion based on the ®rst (``I conclude they are not there on the grounds that (I know) they had to leave''). In (4), which can only be interpreted as a conclusion, dus ®ts in very well, whereas daardoor leads to an unacceptable sequence and daarom is at least odd (indicated by a question mark). Now, the dierences between the three connectives seem to overlap with distinctions put forward in recently developed theoretical proposals. For instance, several discourse theories distinguish between semantic and pragmatic coherence relations and connectives (van Dijk 1977; Sanders et al. 1993) , linguists studying adverbial clauses distinguish between content and epistemic layers of meaning (see Kortmann 1997 for an overview), and Sweetser (1990) introduced a three-level approach to account for dierences in the meaning and use of connectives: the content, epistemic, and speech-act domains. This type of functionally and cognitively oriented approach seemed attractive and promising for the three Dutch causal connectives as well, especially because of the parallelism between classi®cations of relations and connectives, which at ®rst glance seem to show many similarities (Sanders 1997a) .
In recent years we have investigated the relationship between the three causal connectives, and the types of relations they can express in an empirical way, by studying corpora of modern Dutch newspapers. Corpus studies yielded the following characterization of the three connectives in terms of the relations they can and actually do express:
i. daardoor can only express relations of the content nonvolitional type; ii. dus can express content volitional, epistemic, summary, and paraphrase relations, but not content nonvolitional relations. It most often expresses epistemic relations; iii. daarom can express content and epistemic relations. It most often expresses volitional relations.
These results imply that only the use and meaning of daardoor can be described in terms of relational domains (like Sweetser's) or be characterized in terms of the semantic or pragmatic types of coherence relation they can express (Sanders et al. 1993) . However, even in that case we need the additional parameter of volitionalityÐdaardoor is restricted to the content domain, more speci®cally to relations of the nonvolitional content type. In addition, the dierence between daarom and dus is dicult to describe in terms of domains. Although their frequencies in volitional and epistemic relations dier, dus and daarom regularly express both kinds of relations.
Subjectivity in coherence relations and connectives
Because we want to take seriously the idea that actual language use provides indications of the way in which speakers make conceptual categorizations, the question now is: what is it that``epistemic'' causality has in common with``volitional'' causality, so that speakers of Dutch easily use the same vocabulary to express these two relation types, but not to express relations of nonvolitional causality? In Pander Maat and Sanders (2000) and Pander Maat and Degand (in this issue) we have developed an alternative conceptualization that captures the nature of the contrast between nonvolitional and the other causal relations. This conceptualization is based on subjectivity. We will only summarize this approach here.
Subjectivity
What epistemicity and volitionality have in common is that both crucially involve an animate subject, a person, whose intentionality is conceptualized as the ultimate source of the causal event, be it an act of reasoning or some``real-world'' activity. This seems to be a very fundamental distinction: the one between events ultimately originating from some mind, versus events that originate from nonintentional causes; between causes that are crucially located in a subject of consciousness, and those that are located in the inanimate, outside world. This distinction is so fundamental that it shows up in similar ways at dierent linguistic levels, and is often the only one marked explicitly by means of some linguistic form (Verhagen 1995, and other contributions to Stein and Wright 1995) .
The notion of subjectivity is useful in accounting for this idea. Every linguistic utterance can be connected to the point of view of somè`s ubject'', or better, subject of consciousness (or SOC). Often, the subject in question is the speaker. Consider the following sentences:
(5) The neighbors are probably in Paris. (6) I think the neighbors are in Paris. (7) The neighbors are in Paris. Langacker (1990) , who applies the notion of subjectivity to several linguistic phenomena, distinguishes between three situations (see Pit 1997), exempli®ed by (5) to (7).
1 First, the groundÐthe term he uses to refer to the speech event, its participants, and its immediate circumstancesÐmay be entirely external to the semantics of the utterance. This situation is exempli®ed by (7), where no subject of consciousness seems present. Second, the ground may be included in the scope of predication as an ostage, unpro®led reference point. This is the case when deictics like yesterday, tomorrow, etc. are used. Another example is (5), in which the modal adverb probably invokes the present speaker as the source of the probability judgement. Third, the ground may be put onstage, as in (6). In this case, the ground is more or less``objecti®ed'', that is, it is made part of the situation referred to in the utterance.
The subject of consciousness can also be someone other than present speaker, see (8), where Eva is the subject of consciousness. In other words: the information in (8) is perspectivized (J. Sanders and Spooren 1997) .
(8) Eva wants to go to Paris.
Normally, perspectivization requires indicators like verbs of cognition, perception, and evaluation, such as want in (8), as has been shown in recent cognitive linguistic work on perspective and mental spaces (Fauconnier 1994; Fauconnier and Sweetser 1996; Sanders and Redeker 1996) .
2.2. Subjectivity in causal relations: The dierence between dus and daarom?
Returning to the causal connections, we can characterize them by means of their relation to a subject of consciousness and the identity of this subject.
In the nonvolitional daardoor case, example (9), there is no subject of consciousness present because the causality is located outside of this subject of consciousness, in the outside world. This case exempli®es a minimal degree of subjective involvement. Both in the epistemic case (10) and in the volitional case (11), a subject of consciousness can be identi®ed, and these can either be the current speaker, as in the a cases, or someone else, as in the b cases.
(9) Er was een lawine geweest op Roger's pass. Daardoor was de weg geblokkeerd.
There had been an avalanche at Roger's pass. As a result, the road was blocked.' (10) a. Het waren grote grijze vogels, die veel lawaai maakten. Daarom/ Dus moeten het kraanvogels geweest zijn. What epistemic and volitional relations have in common is the presence of a subject of consciousness. This is either the actor choosing a certain course of action (the second segment) for a reason referred to in the ®rst, or a concluder inferring a certain conclusion (the second segment) on the basis of the ®rst. A dierence between epistemic and volitional relations is that the typical volitional subject of consciousness is explicitly realized, while epistemic subjects of consciousness often remain implicit. In these cases (see 10a) the subject of consciousness is by default assumed to be the speaker.
Our corpus studies have shown that, though dus and daarom both may express both kinds of relations, dus most often expresses epistemic relations, while daarom most often expresses volitional relations. Our claim is that this dierence can be explained by a dierence in the degree of speaker subjectivity encoded by the two connectives. By this we mean the involvement of the speaker in the interpretation of the relation as an unpro®led reference point. As we see it, dus expresses a higher degree of speaker subjectivity than daarom.
We have tested this idea in a corpus of newspaper texts (Pander Maat and Sanders 2000). Our ®rst hypothesis runs as follows:
1. The SOC±speaker distance hypothesis: In dus-fragments, the distance between the subject of consciousness and the speaker is smaller than in daarom-fragments, that is, dus-fragments more often have speaker±subjects of consciousness than do daarom-fragments, regardless of the relation expressed.
The typical con®guration for ®rst-person fragments like (11a) can be schematically presented as in Figure 1 : speaker, protagonist and subject of consciousness are identical. Moreover, all three have full mental access to the causal event expressed in the discourse, i.e., both to the situations described in the two segments and to the reason relation connecting them. In other words, speaker and protagonist are identical, and as a result there is a high amount of speaker involvement. As we will show, this con®guration of full transparency can be contrasted with less transparent con®gurations, induced by the use of third instead of ®rst-person protagonists. Furthermore, the type of con®guration will be shown to vary systematically with the type of connective used. Our subjectivity account entails ideas about the perspective present in third-person daarom and dus-fragments. Reconsider example (11b). There are two possible interpretations of this example. In the ®rst one, Arthur leaves as a result of his perception of the time; for instance, he really has to go home, otherwise he will be late for the guests that he is expecting. Under this interpretation, Arthur is the subject of consciousness. The speaker is not involved in the causal relation as such: her role is con®ned to reporting what goes on. This interpretation is presented in Figure 2 , and, as we will argue, daarom / that's why ®ts better than dus/so here.
Crucial to the second interpretation is that the speaker is able to infer that Arthur has gone home, quite apart from the question of whether Arthur has consciously decided to leave or not. Under this interpretation, the speaker is the subject of consciousness, because it is not so much Arthur's decision as her conclusion that is being presented. Hence, this is a case of high speaker involvement. The con®guration that ®ts this interpretation is presented in Figure 3 .
If the segments in example (11b) are connected by dus, the second interpretation (speaker~SOC; Figure 3 ) is preferred, because dus encodes a preference for construing the causal relation from the speaker's point of view. If we want listeners to construct an interpretation in which Arthur is the subject of consciousness (Figure 2), and still use dus, we need to mark the ®rst segment as being presented from the perspective of the nondefault subject of consciousness: the third-person actor, not the speaker, see (11c). In this way, the nondefault subject of consciousness becomes more salient. It is because of this explicit marking that the third person is available as a subject of consciousness and in this way the default preference for speaker-SOC (speaker as subject of consciousness) can be overridden, even though a speaker-centered interpretation of (11c) cannot be completely ruled out. (11) c. Arthur zag dat het zes uur was. Dus hij ging naar huis. Arthur saw it was six o'clock. So he went home.'
Although the resulting interpretation also shows high speaker involvement, it is not identical to the one presented in Figure 1 , since in (11c) the S 1 , connective, S 2
Legend: 3p third-person marker S 1 ®rst segment S 2 second segment X conceptual representation corresponding to S 1 Y conceptual representation plus possible resultant action corresponding to S 2 Ë the causal relation (11b) speaker is more than just an external reporter of the causal event. By contrast, the speaker is presented as taking the protagonists' perspective on the causal relation. This con®guration is sketched in Figure 4 .
A default speaker perspective does not exist for daarom connections, which are considered to be less subjective, that is they tend to be interpreted in terms of the con®guration of Figure 2 . Therefore, daarom does not need this explicit marking of nonspeaker subjects of consciousness in S1.
Now that we have explained the dierences in involvement between the dierent con®gurations, it should also be clear that the ®gures were not presented in the order of subjectivity or involvement. After all, Figure 2 shows minimal involvement and subjectivity (the speaker only reports a causal relation in the world), whereas Figure 1 shows maximal speaker involvement and subjectivity (the speaker herself is responsible for the causal relation, either by a conclusion or by a volitional action in segment 2). In between are Figures 3 (high involvement, but the protagonist is not aware of the causal relation) and 4 (high involvement by empathy with the protagonist who is aware of the causal relation).
One obvious way to test these predictions on dierences in subjectivity is to formulate them in text-analytical terms, as we have done in the following. For the moment, we con®ne ourselves to third-person fragments. Here is the second hypothesis we tested.
S 1 , connective, S 2
Legend: 3p third-person marker S 1 ®rst segment S 2 second segment X conceptual representation corresponding to S 1 Y conceptual representation plus possible resultant action corresponding to S 2 Ë the causal relation (11c) 2. The marked third person±SOC hypothesis: In third-person dusfragments, the ®rst segment will more often be marked for the perspective of the third-person subject of consciousness than in third-person daarom-fragments.
The results of our corpus studies can be summarized as follows. With regard to the subject of consciousness±speaker distance we found that dus often accompanies segments with speaker subjects of consciousness, while daarom typically accompanies third-person nominal subjects of consciousness (Pander Maat and Sanders 2000: Tables 2 and 3 ). In addition, the marked third person±SOC hypothesis was supported for the volitional corpus (Pander Maat and Sanders 2000: Table 1 ), but could not be tested for epistemic relations, because no third-person epistemic relations with dus were found at all.
Experimental tests of the subjectivity account
If our subjectivity account of the dierence between dus and daarom is indeed valid, language users should see them as dierent categories. Therefore, they should be able to systematically dierentiate between the two. For this reason, we have tested our account in another wayÐby asking language users for their intuitions. An additional advantage of this methodology is that it allows us to test intuitions on discourse fragments that do not occur in corpora, such as third-person epistemic relations with dus.
Experiment 1: Judging volitional relations
Pursuing the idea that the dierence between dus and daarom is determined by subjectivity, that is by the presence of a subject of consciousness and its distance from the speaker, we have designed an experimental set-up in which this idea could be put to the test. We constructed discourse fragments with sentence pairs that could be connected by dus and daarom. Subjects were asked to state their preference for one of the connectives. The ®rst experiment concerned volitional relations. The goal of the experiment was to ®nd out whether language users more often choose dus when speaker±subject of consciousness distance is small and a non-speaker subject of consciousness has been marked in the preceding utterance. Two independent variables were included:
1. Actor identity in S2: ®rst-person versus third-person actor in S1, where the third-person actor was always indicated with a name instead of a pronoun, in order to create optimal distance from the speaker; 2. Source in S1: actor or other (i.e., non-actor).
The combination of the two variables resulted in four experimental conditions:
i. S1: other source; S2: ®rst-person actor ii. S1: actor source; S2: ®rst-person actor iii. S1: other source; S2: third-person actor iv. S1: actor source; S2: third-person actor Two hypotheses were tested.
H1: The SOC±speaker distance hypothesis. Subjects more often choose dus in the fragments with ®rst-person actors in the second segment than in fragments with third-person actors in this segment. H2: The marked third person±SOC hypothesis. In third-person fragments, subjects more often choose dus in fragments in which the third-person actor is source in the ®rst segment than they do in fragments in which the ®rst segment has another source. This is because non-speaker subjects of consciousness need to be marked in the ®rst segment, that is they need to be made contextually salient in the preceding utterances, in order for dus to be appropriate. By contrast, this marking is not necessary for daarom-fragments, because daarom does not encode a preference for speaker±subjects of consciousness.
For ®rst-person fragments we do not expect the source in the ®rst segment to aect the appropriateness of dus and daarom. This is because the ®rst segment will be considered as presented from the perspective of the speaker anyway, regardless of its source. The general principle behind this assumption is that, until further notice, all information presented by the speaker is mentally accessible for the speaker, cf. Fauconnier's Base Space (Fauconnier 1994; Sanders and Redeker 1996) . Hence, when a thirdperson source presents information on which the speaker bases an action, this information will appear in the speaker's perspective as well.
Since we expect the source variable to have in¯uence only in the thirdperson fragments, we expect to ®nd a statistical interaction between our two independent variables. 3.1.1. Method Materials. Four versions of twelve text fragments were constructed. The versions varied with respect to the two independent variables: source in the ®rst segment and actor identity in the second. The combination of the two variables results in four experimental variants, illustrated in example (12).
(12) a. [S1: non-actor source (Name); S2: ®rst person]
Het KNMI heeft voorspeld dat het 10 graden gaat vriezen vandaag. Ik ga daarom/dus niet mee wandelen.
The weather forecaster predicted that there will be 10 degrees of frost. I will daarom/dus not come for a walk.' b. [S1: actor source; S2: ®rst person]
Ik heb gehoord dat het 10 graden gaat vriezen vandaag. Ik ga daarom/dus niet mee wandelen.
I heard that there will be 10 degrees of frost. I will daarom/dus not come for a walk.' c. [S1: non-actor source (Name); S2: Name]
Het KNMI heeft voorspeld dat het 10 graden gaat vriezen vandaag.
Willem gaat daarom/dus niet mee wandelen.
The weatherman forecasted that there will be 10 degrees of frost.
Willem will daarom/dus not come for a walk.' d. [S1: actor source; S2: Name]
Willem heeft gehoord dat het 10 graden gaat vriezen vandaag. Willem gaat daarom/dus niet mee wandelen.
Willem heard that there will be 10 degrees of frost. Willem will daarom/dus not come for a walk.'
There were ®fteen ®ller items, similar to the experimental items but requiring judgements on other connectives, i.e., eight doordat±omdat as a consequence ± because' items and seven bovendien±daarnaast furthermore±also' items. The two experimental factors, each with two levels, yielded four experimental conditions. Four sets of experimental texts were constructed. Each set consisted of 27 fragments. Each set contains all four conditions. In the ®rst set, the ®rst item appeared in the ®rst condition, the second item in the second condition, etc. In the second set, the ®rst item appeared in the second condition, the second item in the third condition, etc. Filler items were inserted between dierent experimental items. Three sets of texts were presented to 26 subjects, a fourth set was presented to 27 subjects.
Procedure. The experiment was conducted group-wise in class rooms. It started with a written instruction. Subjects were asked to consider the fragments carefully. They were informed that there were two alternatives for each last sentence of a fragment and that the alternatives varied in the dierent use of a``connecting word''.
They were asked to ®ll in the multiple-choice question following each fragment, and to follow their own judgement on which of the two candidate sentences``sounds best to you''. They were to judge each fragment on a three-point scale. They could choose three multiple-choice options: (1) in my opinion, dus ®ts better here; (2) in my opinion, daarom ®ts better here; or a third option, (3) in my opinion both dus and daarom are possible.
Subjects. One hundred and ®ve students of the Faculty of Arts at Utrecht University participated in partial ful®llment of a course requirement.
Results
The raw scores and proportions are summarized in Table 1 . In this table responses are summarized over individual items by conditions. To investigate whether there was an interaction between the two factors of source and actor identity, a loglinear analysis was carried out. This analysis was used because it not only produces estimates of main eects but also of interaction eects in nonparametrical data. 4 Statistical analysis showed a main eect for both manipulated factors. That is, subjects choose dus more often with ®rst-person actors than with third-person actors. (See note 4, Table [ i], where model 4 ®ts signi®cantly better than model 3.) This ®nding is illustrated in the items in (13), in which the mean proportions for the three alternatives are presented in parentheses in the second segments. Compare especially (13a) and (13b) versus (13c) and (13d).
Additionally, subjects choose dus more often when the source in the ®rst segment is the actor. (In note 4, These results clearly con®rm the SOC±speaker distance hypothesis. As for the marked third person±SOC hypothesis, our expectation was con®rmed that in ®rst-person fragments, the information from a non-actor source cannot retrospectively be viewed in the speaker perspective, so that dus is still more or less appropriate. However, the appropriateness of dus decreases in the case of non-actor sources in third-person fragments, since in these cases the information from the ®rst segment is harder to incorporate in the actor perspective. That is, when both the non-actor in the ®rst segment and the actor in the second are third persons, their two perspectives exclude each other, so that the relation can not be interpreted as being produced within a single subject of consciousness.
Experiment 2: Epistemic relations
The ideas pursued in the ®rst experiment are identical to the ones aimed at in the second experiment, the only dierence being that we are now dealing with epistemic relations. This implies that the role of the actor in the volitional relation is replaced by that of the concluder in the case of the epistemic relation. Three hypotheses were tested, the ®rst two identical to those for volitional relations in experiment 1.
H1:
The SOC±speaker distance hypothesis. Subjects more often choose dus in the fragments with ®rst-person concluders in the second segment than in fragments with third-person concluders in this segment. H2: The marked third person±SOC hypothesis. In third-person fragments, subjects more often choose dus in fragments in which the third-person concluder is source in the ®rst segment than they do in fragments in which the ®rst segment has another source.
For the epistemic experiment we have added a third hypothesis. Language users are faced with a fundamental choice in formulating ®rst-person conclusions: do they explicitly mention the concluder (e.g., I think, I suppose, I suspect, in my view, I am convinced, I expect) or do they leave the concluder implicit, for instance by the use of modal verbs (must), modal adverbs (surely), evaluative adjectives (good, worthwhile) or a combination ( probably will ). Examples (14a) and (14b) contain an explicit ®rst-person marker, examples (15a) and (15b) an implicit one. Let us recall that dus is hypothesized to encode a high degree of speaker subjectivity. Langacker (1990) has demonstrated that subjectivity is maximal when the concluder is construed as an ostage reference point, that is, when she or he is absent from the proposition. Hence, we expect dus to be more appropriate in implicit fragments (such as [15] ) than in explicit fragments (such as [14] Yesterday evening I did not see any lights burning in our neighbors' house. Daarom/``Both''/Dus I think that they haven't returned from their holiday yet.' c. [S1: non-concluder source; S2: Name] Dirk's broer Alex zag gisteravond nog steeds geen licht branden in het huis van de buren. Dirk denkt daarom/``both''/dus dat ze nog niet terug zijn van vakantie.
Yesterday evening Dirk's brother Alex did not see any lights burning in our neighbors' house. Daarom/``Both''/Dus Dirk thinks that they haven't returned from their holiday yet.' d. [S1: concluder source; S2: Name] Alex zag nog steeds geen licht branden in het huis van de buren. Hij denkt daarom/``both''/dus dat ze nog niet terug zijn van vakantie.
`Yesterday evening Alex did not see any lights burning in our neighbors' house. Daarom/``Both''/Dus he thinks that they haven't returned from their holiday yet.' (15) a. [S1: non-concluder source; S2: I; implicit speaker]
De deskundigen in Voetbal International vinden dat Frankrijk een heel evenwichtig elftal heeft. Frankrijk zal daarom/``both''/dus wel wereldkampioen worden. The experts interviewed in the magazine Soccer International think that France has a well-balanced team. Daarom/``Both''/Dus France will probably win the World Championship.' b. [S1: concluder source; S2: I; implicit speaker]
Frankrijk heeft een heel evenwichtig elftal. Frankrijk zal daarom/``both''/dus wel wereldkampioen worden.
France has a well-balanced team. Daarom/``Both''/Dus France will probably win the World Championship.' c. [S1: non-concluder source; S2: nominal phrase]
De deskundigen in Voetbal International vinden dat Frankrijk een heel evenwichtig elftal heeft. Veel van mijn collega's denken dat Frankrijk daarom/``both''/ dus wel wereldkampioen zal worden.
The experts interviewed in the magazine Soccer International think that France has a well-balanced team. Daarom/``Both''/Dus a lot of my colleagues think that France will probably win the World Championship.' d. [S1: concluder source; S2: nominal phrase]
Veel van mijn collega's vinden dat Frankrijk een heel evenwichtig elftal heeft. Ze denken dat Frankrijk daarom/``both''/dus wel wereldkampioen zal worden.
A lot of my colleagues think that France has a well-balanced team. Daarom/``Both''/Dus a lot of my colleagues think that France will probably win the World Championship.' 3.2.2. Method Materials. Four versions of sixteen text fragments were constructed. The versions varied with respect to the three independent variables: source in the ®rst segment, concluder identity in the second segment, and speaker realization in the second segment. The last variable is only productive in ®rst-person fragments. The combination of the three variables results in six experimental variants, illustrated in the preceding examples. The procedure was identical to that in experiment 1.
Subjects. Eighty-four students of the Faculty of Arts at Utrecht University participated in partial ful®llment of a course requirement.
Results
The mean scores for each condition are presented in Table 2 . In this table responses are summarized over individual items by conditions. Data were analyzed in a similar way to experiment 1. 5 Statistical analysis indicated that only one factor showed a main eect:``concluder identity in S2''. As the raw scores in Table 2 show, this eect consists of a sharp reduction in the number of dus choices when the concluder in the second segment is referred to by name. Source in the ®rst segment barely aects subjects' preferences for dus or daarom. Here, the marked third-person hypothesis is not supported, whereas the SOC±speaker distance hypothesis is. Table 2 . Experiment 2: Epistemic relationsÐraw scores and row proportions for dus,``both can be used'', and daarom in four conditions, determined by factors``source in S1'' and``concluder identity'' in S2 The implicit speaker hypothesis required a second loglinear analysis, for which only half of the data set served as input, i.e., those cases in which the speaker was identical to the concluder in the second segment. 6 Statistical analysis indicated that the implicit speaker hypothesis is supported by these results. For implicit speaker-concluders, dus is clearly preferred over daarom, while the reverse is true for explicit speakers.
Discussion of the experimental results
On the whole, the results of experiments 1 and 2 show that dus ®ts better in epistemic relations than it does in volitional relations, but even in epistemic relations it is only preferred to daarom in implicit ®rst-person (I ) variants. Daarom is preferred to dus in all other cases. We found similar results in corpus studies.
If we take a more precise look at the testing of the hypotheses, we can say that the SOC±speaker distance hypothesis is supported by the data, whereas the marked third person±SOC hypothesis shows mixed results. The strong support for the ®rst hypothesis shows that, although daarom and dus can both express epistemic and volitional causal relations, there is also a clear dierence between the two connectives: dus ®ts better when the distance between the speaker and the actor/concluder is small, i.e., when they are identical, daarom ®ts better as the distance between the speaker and the textual protagonist increases. In line with this is the support for the implicit speaker hypothesis in epistemic relations. In the case of implicit speaker/concluders, the distance is smallest and the preference for dus is greatest.
However, there are still some unsettled issues. With respect to the marked third person±SOC hypothesis, there is a discrepancy between the results of the epistemic and the volitional study, in that dus is disfavoured in third-person fragments with non-actor sources for volitional relations, while it does appear possible to employ dus in the same context with epistemic relations (third-person fragments with non-concluder sources).
Conclusion
This study provides further evidence for the relevance of the notion of subjectivity in explaining a systematic dierence in the lexicon of Dutch causal connectives, i.e., dus versus daarom. We have proposed considering the dierence between the connectives in terms of subjectivity, or, more precisely, in terms of the degree of implicit involvement of the speaker in the construction of the causal relation. In this subjectivity account, the connectives can be characterized as follows. In relations expressed by daarom`that's why', there is a certain distance between the speaker and the subject of consciousness, whereas in the case of dus`so', this distance is small or even absent, as in the case where the speaker and subject of consciousness are identical.
In earlier studies, we have shown that this approach accounts for the actual distribution of the connectives in newspaper corpora (Pander Maat and Sanders 2000) . In the current study, we tested such an approach in judging experiments. The results indicate that Dutch speakers show clear patterns of preference when asked to choose the best ®tting forward causal connective in natural discourse fragments. Dus is considered more appropriate when the distance between the speaker and the actor/concluder is small, in fact the two can even be identical. Daarom ®ts better when the distance between speaker and the textual protagonist is increased. In line with this is the support we found for the implicit speaker hypothesis in epistemic relations. In the case of implicit speaker/concluders, the distance between the subject of consciousness and the speaker is smallest and the preference for dus at a maximum.
The experimental results also speci®cally con®rm that subjectivity rather than domain speci®city (as derived from Sweetser 1990, see section 1) determines the choice of dus versus daarom. Dus is not more appropriate in epistemic relations in general; it only ®ts better in the case of ®rst-person subjects of consciousness. In other words, SOC±speaker distance overrules domain dierences. Moreover, the fact that dus is more appropriate in epistemic relations with implicit ®rst-person concluders than in those with explicit ®rst-person concluders cannot be explained in terms of domain dierences.
One speci®c experimental result deserves some more discussion here. In line with our expectations, language users more often choose dus in thirdperson fragments in which the third-person actor was source in the ®rst segment (see example [13c]), as compared to fragments in which this segment has another source (as in [13d]). However, contrary to our expectations, this eect was not repeated for epistemic relations; here, judges found that dus is equally appropriate in third-person fragments with a source (see [14c] ) other than the concluder. How can this lack of preference be explained? It seems likely that in an epistemic relation one may take the perspective of the concluder anyway: both the conclusion and the premiss are situated exclusively within the mental domain of the concluder. By contrast, in volitional relations the reason for an action and the action itself may be viewed as facts which are accessible both from the perspective of an outside observer (such as the author) and from the perspective of the acting protagonist. For that reason, placing it ®rmly into the perspective of the protagonist does increase the appropriateness of dus in volitional fragments. By contrast, the epistemic relation is by its nature a subjective phenomenon, because thoughts and conclusions cannot be observed by outsiders. Or, to use Fauconnier's (1994) concept of space building, epistemic relations strongly trigger space building in retrospect and volitional relations do not necessarily do so. Dus probably ®ts better in epistemic relations because these relations are of themselves more subjective. Volitional relations, however, are less inherently subjective, since an external reporter perspective is always conceivable; see also Pander Maat and Degand (this issue).
Analyzing discourse-structure phenomena is a major challenge for cognitive linguistics (Sanders 1997b) , not only because the grounding of language in discourse is central to any functional account of language (Langacker 2001) , but also because we have relatively little insight into the linguistic principles underlying discourse structure. In this article, we have taken up this challenge by investigating crucial discourse elements: causal connectives. Even though we have only studied two Dutch causal connectives, it has become clear that the theoretical notion of subjectivity provides insight in the categories underlying discourse phenomena such as these in a way that promises to be applicable to other connectives as well. The discussion of subjectivity also seems to open the way to an approach in terms of mental spaces, along the lines of Fauconnier and Sweetser (1996) and Dancygier and Sweetser (2000) .
We expect this type of account to be fruitful for other analyses at the discourse level, just like we hope the methodology of``converging evidence''Ðtheoretical analysis, corpus studies, and experimentsÐto be stimulating for the further study of language in use. We thank the colleagues present at these meetings for sharpening our thoughts. We are grateful to two anonymous reviewers, Alistair Knott and Catherine Emmott for comments on an earlier version. Needless to say, all remaining errors are ours. Furthermore, we would like to thank Huub van den Bergh for invaluable statistical advice, Marijn Kampf for developing smiles, and our students for cooperating in the experiments. 1. The literature review presented here is somewhat selective. We are aware that in the ®eld of literary stylistics, for instance, there is much work on focalization, subjecti®cation, and perspective, by Genette and Fludernik, for instance. However, we focus on the linguistic approaches here (cf. also J. Sanders and Spooren 1997). 2. In fact the ground is nearly always involved in the semantics of tense, because tense contains an orientation of the moment of speaking with regard to an external event.
However, in this article we con®ne our use of the notion of subjectivity to the epistemic responsibility of the speaker for her statements. 3. In this article we have translated daarom as`that's why'. We are aware of the fact that that's why can reintroduce``discourse-old'' information. In this respect it diers from daarom, which needs a rather special contrastive accent on the ®rst syllable to be used in this way. In more general terms, matters of information structure do not bear directly on the subjectivity approach as developed here, and hence we will not discuss them here. 4. The likelihood ratio, which indicates the goodness of ®t of the model with the data is G 2 (Pearson's has better distributional properties for small samples, because it is based on the Poisson distribution rather than on the normal distribution. G 2 is asymptotically ( w 2 distributed (Fienberg 1980) . Table ( i) shows the ®t of the x dierent logit-models, in which the ®rst model contains C (all cells are equal in frequency), the second the connective (CON), the source in the ®rst segment, and actor identity in the second (S2). The second model assumes that all cells with the same connective are equal, all cells with an identical source in the ®rst segment are equal, and that all cells with an identical actor in the second segment are equal. The third model introduces the ®rst interaction term: connective by source in the ®rst segment. Here, it is assumed that all cells characterized by an identical combination of values of the connective and source variable are equal. Hence, the model assumes that dierences in choice of connective depend on the ®rst segment. The fourth model adds a second interaction term: connective by actor identity in the second segment. Finally, the ®fth model adds the last interaction term: connective by source in the ®rst segment by actor identity in the second. (Note that only this last interaction term can be compared to what is generally referred to as an``interaction'' in other statistical techniques, e.g., analysis of variance.) The ®fth model, which includes all parameters, ®ts perfectly. In Table ( ii) the goodness of ®t with the data is compared; it is computed how much better one model ®ts the data than another. 5. Table ( iii) shows the ®t of the x dierent logit-models, in which the ®rst model contains C (all cells are equal in frequency), the second the connective (CON), the source in the ®rst segment (S1) and concluder identity in the second segment (S2). The second model assumes that all cells with the same connective are equal, all cells with an identical source in the ®rst segment are equal, and that all cells with an identical concluder in the second segment are equal. The third model introduces the ®rst interaction term: connective by source in the ®rst segment. Here, it is assumed that all cells characterized by an identical combination of values for the connective and source variables are equal. Hence, the model assumes that dierences in choice of connective depend on the ®rst segment. The fourth model adds a second interaction term: connective by concluder identity in the second segment. Because the fourth model ®tted the data in a satisfactory way, no additional models were included in the analysis. In Table ( iv) the goodness of ®t with the data is compared; it is computed how much better one model ®ts the data than another.
6. See tables (v) and (vi). 
